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Abstract 
This thesis sought to study the influence of religion on corporate governance in Microfinance 
Institutions. The study uses secondary data on a sample of rated Christian and secular MFIs 
compiled in rating reports by rating agencies to compare the governance differences and 
similarities between Christian and secular MFIs. The research uses the random effects General 
Least Squares and logistic regression models alongside other univariate statistical methods to test 
for the effect of religious affiliation on corporate governance. The overall findings indicate that 
Christian MFIs are significantly less-regulated by banking authorities in a country than secular 
MFIs and also Christian MFIs have a significant higher tendency to use the services of the big 
four external auditors (see table 4-3) than secular MFIs. Otherwise, the results revealed that 
Christian and secular MFIs are essentially similar in terms of board size, number of board 
meetings in a year, top management size, number of international directors, number of female 
directors, the probabilities of having a female CEO, CEO/Chairman duality, NGO or a 
Cooperative legal status and CEO with business experience and business education.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
1.  Introduction 
The search for an efficient and effective corporate governance system has been a major concern 
for all organizations, for profit and non-profit alike (Hall, 2002 p.2). This paper seeks to 
investigate the impact of religious affiliation on corporate governance in Microfinance 
Institutions (MFIs) by comparing Christian to secular MFIs along a set of corporate governance 
mechanisms. This chapter presents the background to the study, the statement of the research 
problem, the research objective, research question, and the relevance of the study, a brief 
description of the data and methodology and the organization of the study.  
1.1  Background to the Study 
The complementary role played by Christian organizations in the socio-economic development 
of many countries cannot be underestimated and as a result, many governments around the globe 
do not hesitate to use people of faith as a medium to deliver public services (Forren, 2006 p.161). 
Mersland, D‟espallier & Supphellen (2013 p.145), indicated that, religion may influence the 
perceptions and behaviors of several parties in the development process. They further observed 
that many aid and development organizations are based on religious principles and are managed 
by people who are inspired by religious beliefs. In the microfinance industry, “several Christian 
actors such as Opportunity International and Vision Fund are helping to expand the industry”. 
(Mersland et al., 2013 pp.146-147).  
  
Hall, (2002 p.3) noted that, “until fairly recently, religious bodies and faith-based organizations 
were free of many of the burdens of accountability”. However, Hall (2002) remarked that, the 
continuous record of misdeeds involving clergy, religious bodies, and faith-based organizations 
over the past few decades have faded away both the impression of high purpose and the reality of 
political influence that had for so long protected religious entities from being held answerable.  
Some spectacular scandals involving Christian organizations include, the financial improprieties 
reported of the leadership of the Orthodox Church in America between 2005 and 2008 
(Cooperman, 2006). Hall (2002) made another report about the Baptist Foundation of Arizona, 
which was a faith-based mutual fund set up to finance the activities of charities managed by the 
Church. According to the report by Hall (2002 p.10), after having sold securities worth more 
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than $500 million within the half century prior to 1996, the foundation contributed only $1.3 
million to the church. Meanwhile, it had paid its staff more than $16 million. These and many 
other similar incidence that continues to recur in religious organizations have caught the 
attention of governments, donor agencies and clients of religiously based organizations involved 
in economic activities to demand proper accountability. While it is undeniable that a lot of faith-
based organizations are involved in the steadily growing microfinance industry, few scholarly 
studies have explored the impact of religious affiliation on performance and governance even in 
the light of heightened debate concerning mission drift in the industry.   
 
In their study of the effects of religion on development efforts, Mersland et al. (2013), explored 
the differences between Christian and secular microfinance institutions along the lines of social 
and financial performance. Their findings indicated that, Christian MFIs perform quite 
differently from secular MFIs along several dimensions. For instance, they found out that; 
Christian MFIs reach relatively fewer female clients and their average loan sizes was at par with 
their secular peers which were contrary to hypotheses. Christian MFIs have a lower cost of 
funding, and have lower bottom-line financial performance compared with secular MFIs which 
concurred with hypothesis. Also, contrary to hypothesis, Christian MFIs were as effective in 
enforcing loan repayment as their secular peers. These findings discussed above signals that 
religious identity, to a greater or lesser extent, has an impact on MFIs‟ performance which could 
also imply differences in governance systems and structures.  
 
Again, while these findings suggest some significant role of Christianity in the management of 
economic organizations, the debate does not just end there. Other scholars such as Max Weber in 
his thesis “The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism” (1958), argued that, while 
conventional Christian doctrines such as Catholicism, seems to be ritualistic and does not 
encourage proaction, other Christian philosophies such as Protestantism, encourages hard work, 
the accumulation of wealth, and profitable investments in enterprises. This argument by Weber 
(1958) suggests that even among Christian actors there could be dissenting views on the ideal 
attitudes towards work, and this makes the current study a vital one. According to the agency 
theory of corporate governance, “in any contractual relationship between two parties namely a 
principal and an agent, whereby the latter has been engaged by the former to perform a service 
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on his behalf, assuming that both parties are utility maximizers, it is generally impossible for the 
principal or the agent at zero cost to ensure that the agent will make optimal decisions from the 
principal‟s viewpoint” (Jensen & Meckling, 1976, p. 308). The proponents of this theory 
therefore suggest that, certain governance structures including ownership are necessary to 
mitigate such divergences in motivations (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama & Jensen, 1983). On 
the contrary, proponents of the Stewardship theory argue that, some agents are intrinsically 
motivated to work towards the organizational objectives set by the principal. Besley and Ghatak 
(2005, p. 616) indicated that, “organizations that provide collective goods stick around a 
mission”. This mission comes from the primary incentives of the persons (principals and agents) 
who work in the mission-oriented sector. Workers are usually motivated agents, i.e., agents who 
pursue goals because they perceive intrinsic rewards from doing so (Besley & Ghatak, 2005). 
Considering these theoretical viewpoints and empirical findings, can one presume that, by virtue 
of their religious indoctrination, Christian MFIs will have governance systems and structures that 
are significantly different from secular MFIs? This leads to the problem for this study.    
1.2  Statement of the Problem 
According to Harper, Rao, and Sahu (2007), several religion-based actors, including Hindu, 
Islamic, and especially Christian organizations are involved in the rapidly growing microfinance 
industry. Moreover, as captured in the previous section, Mersland et al. (2013) were able to 
identify significant differences in social and financial performance between Christian and 
Secular MFIs. Meanwhile, several studies have also identified a link between corporate 
governance mechanisms and social and financial performance in MFIs (e.g. Hartarska, 2005; 
Mersland & Strøm, 2009; Hartarska, Mersland & Nadolnyak, 2014). So one would ask if 
religious affiliation has an impact on MFI performance and corporate governance could also 
impact MFI performance; could it be inferred therefore that religion can also impact an MFI‟s 
governance structure? The focus of this paper therefore is to investigate whether religious 
affiliation has an impact on governance in MFIs. The figure 1-1 below conceptualizes the 
research problem 
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Figure 1-1  The Research Problem 
   
                                                                                          
1.3  The Research Objective 
 To find out if there exist any significant differences in corporate governance between Christian 
and secular MFIs 
1.4  The Research Question 
 Are Christian MFIs significantly different from secular MFIs in terms of corporate governance? 
1.5  The Relevance of the Study 
Labie and Mersland (2011, p. 2) observed that, “the wide variety in origins and the many 
different stakeholders, with their often competing interests and competencies, together form one 
of the reasons why corporate governance in microfinance is an interesting research area”. Earlier 
publications on key challenges confronting the microfinance industry also pointed to the fact 
that, corporate governance is among the most pressing (CSFI, 2008; Dichter & Harper, 2007).  
Moreover, according to Tsafe and Rahman (2013 p.675), “modern trends in management science 
research suggests a paradigm shift in the direction that embraces not only the drive for profit but 
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also for social and religious responsibilities and hence there is a call for problem-solving 
approaches to be broadened to incorporate spiritual dimensions”. Henceforth, this study is 
important because it will add to the limited literature on religious affiliation and its impact on 
MFIs‟ governance and will provide the basis for future empirical studies on religion and 
corporate governance.  
1.6  Data and Research Methodology  
The data used in the analysis contain information from 403 MFIs in 73 countries. Out of this 
number of MFIs, approximately 17% have a Christian origin. Univariate statistical techniques 
including t-test and χ2-test were first used to compare the differences in means and medians 
respectively between Christian and secular MFIs along a selected set of corporate governance 
mechanisms. Next, by using the panel data model, I regress the different governance variables 
on the dummy for Christian affiliation alongside a set of control variables by means of random 
effects General Least Square (GLS) and Logistic regression methods in STATA to test the 
research hypothesis. In order to enhance the robustness of the results, the study uses an 
alternative methodological approach in which case the dummy for Christian affiliation is used as 
the dependent variable and the governance variables are used as independent variables.  
1.7  The Organization of the Study 
This thesis is organised under seven chapters. Chapter one gives a brief introduction to the study. 
The introduction covers the background to the study, the research problem, the research 
objective and question, relevance of the study and a brief description of the data set and the 
research methodology. The second chapter covers a review of literature and is made up three 
sections. The first section reviews literature on trends in the microfinance industry and the issue 
of corporate governance in microfinance institutions. The second section also presents the 
Christian organisation and the implications on governance and the third section captures 
literature on past empirical findings on the governance variables used in the study. Chapter three 
also captures the basic applicable theories and the research hypotheses. In Chapter four, I present 
and describe the data set and sample as well as the research methodology. Chapter five presents 
the research findings as produced by the data analysis techniques and these findings are 
discussed in chapter six. Finally, Chapter seven presents the conclusion, implications, limitations 
of the study and recommendations for further research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
2.  Literature Review 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter is composed of three sections. The first section presents a review of literature on the 
history and trends in the microfinance industry and why corporate governance has become an 
important issue in modern microfinance institutions. The second section presents literature 
review on the Christian organization and its implications on corporate governance and finally the 
last section covers literature on past studies on the governance variables used in the study.     
2.2  The Microfinance Industry and the issue of Corporate Governance 
The World Bank, other concerned agencies and individuals have been consistent in reporting 
issues of extreme poverty especially in emerging economies where access to formal productive 
capital is not readily-available (Tsafe & Rahman, 2013 p. 675). To address this issue, Tsafe and 
Rahman, (2013 p. 675) indicated that, respective nations, international agencies, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and commercial enterprises have taken measures aimed at 
alleviating the widespread poverty through microfinance institutions. Labie and Mersland 
(2011), observed that, microfinance which is understood as the means and institutions created in 
order to provide financial services to people excluded from traditional banking, has a long 
history. Microfinance has been an excellent tool for enhancing development, and in 2005, it 
enjoyed the honor of a-UN international year in addition to a recognition by the Norwegian 
Nobel Committee, which awarded the Peace Prize to microfinance pioneer Mohammad Yunus 
and Grameen Bank in Bangladesh in 2006 (Dichter & Harper, 2007; Mersland et al., 2013). 
According to a report by the Center for the Study of Financial Innovations (CSFI, 2008 p. 1), a 
major feature of microfinance is that, “it is a bottom-up approach to development, very different 
to traditional top-down approach that dominated academic thinking for many years”. This 
approach according to the report has special advantages because, “whatever its shortcomings, 
microfinance does ensure that more of the „development dollar‟ gets spent at the local or village 
level than has historically been the case”. (CSFI, 2008 p.1). Present-day microfinance in 
particular, which has emerged since the 1970s, owes much to the cooperative movement and to 
traditional „informal‟ financial practices including financial self-help groups such as the Rotating 
Savings and Credit Associations (ROSCAs) – that have been popular for centuries across the 
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world (Labie & Mersland, 2011; Bouman, 1995). From an international development 
perspective, Labie and Mersland (2011) noticed that, microfinance has gained increasing 
attention due to a wide variety of new institutions .  
Armendariz and Labie (2011, p. 3), indicated that, “microfinance started initially by what is often 
referred to as a „civil society”. It was largely built upon initiatives from non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs), e.g. BancoSol of Bolivia and Cooperatives (COOPs).” Another example 
is the well-known Grameen Bank which started as a small pilot project with NGO-features in 
Chittagong, Bangladesh, in 1976. The Grameen Bank is currently an established financial entity 
under the legal status of a cooperative serving over six million clients in Bangladesh, with 
hundreds of replications worldwide (Armendariz and Labie, 2011). Also of great interest, 
Mersland et al. (2013 p.147) indicated that, many MFIs have Christian backgrounds. For 
example, the international network of Opportunity International currently includes 43 MFIs in 26 
countries, and the Vision Fund of World Vision operates 42 MFIs in 42 countries. Other 
important international Christian microfinance actors include Catholic Relief Services, 
Mennonite Economic Development Associates (MEDA), the Norwegian Mission Alliance, 
World Relief, Cordaid, Oikocredit and the Strømme Foundation.  They further noted that, from a 
historical perspective, Christian organizations are actively involved in traditional aid and 
development efforts and in enterprising and banking initiatives. For example, in Europe, 
Protestant pastors and Christian businesspeople were at the forefront in the savings bank 
movement that spread throughout Europe 150–200 years ago (Horne, 1947 cited Mersland et al., 
2013 p.147). 
 
Armendariz & Labie, (2011 pp. 5-6), observed that, “yearly summits, microfinance platforms, 
and regular practitioners‟ conferences worldwide have facilitated diffusion of technology and 
expertise across numerous microfinance initiatives”. These world-wide gatherings in recent 
years, according to Armendariz and Labie (2011, p. 6), have led to at least five well-defined 
trends in the microfinance industry. These changes include, a change in lending methodology 
from for example, solidarity groups to a focus on individual lending; a change in the supply of 
financial products as captured by the terms „microfinance‟ instead of „microcredit‟; and a larger 
and more diverse pool of suppliers. Other changes include a radical transformation in 
supervision and regulation and a fundamental change in financial priorities (from self-
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sustainability to profit maximization). Armendariz & Labie (2011 p.4) further noted that 
microfinance currently serves a small percentage of the unbanked poor (6%) and this failure to 
expand outreach has been a subject of debate among relevant stakeholders. To some, the 
insufficient numbers alone are apparent evidence of the failure of microfinance to include the 
poor. They however indicated their disagreement by suggesting that, if well-designed, 
microfinance has the potential to improve the living standards of millions of unbanked poor 
throughout the world and this leads to the issue of corporate governance. 
2.3  Christian Organizations and the issue of Corporate Governance 
Smith and Rayment (2007) explained that, spirituality in the workplace is about individuals and 
organizations perceiving an occupation as a spiritual path, as an opportunity to grow and to 
contribute to society in a meaningful way. Spirituality as defined by Smith and Rayment (2007 
p.220) “is a state or experience that can provide individuals with direction or meaning, or 
provide feelings of understanding, support, inner wholeness or connectedness. Connectedness 
can be to themselves, other people, nature, the universe, God, or some other supernatural power”.  
 
Hall, (2002) indicated that a lot of religious entities are free-standing self-managing group of 
believers and essentially informal lacking even ordained clergy. However, there are many others 
that are formally organized with by-laws, governing boards and professionally-trained religious 
leaders and administrators and this makes religious organizations extraordinary in their variety 
and complexity. Adding to this variety and complexity, Hall (2002) noted, is the fact that various 
religious organizations are involved in providing a range of social services with different motives 
and forms of control. He noted that, “while some religious groups like the Salvation Army and a 
number of Catholic religious orders provide services as a form of devotional activity, others 
create secular corporations to which they are tied in a variety of ways”. This ranges from church 
control through the nominal inclusion of church officials on governing boards. “Other faith-
based organizations are religious in name only, having no formal relations to religious bodies” he 
added (Hall, 2002 p.11). These among several other differences among Christian organizations 
could reflect in their basic organizational principles and possibly their approach to corporate 
governance. (Hall, 2002, p. 2) further noted that, “there is an increase in scope, scale, and range 
of services provided by faith-based organizations and their dependence on government funding 
has also increased resulting in an intensified need for resolution of unanswered questions about 
9 
 
their accountability.” He observed that, on the one hand, the increase in government subvention 
has predictably brought with it higher standards of accountability and financial management. On 
the other hand, Hall (2002) indicated that, to the extent that religious bodies and faith-based 
organizations continue to rely significantly on private funds, they have become involved in the 
general problems of accountability that has affected corporate management and governance 
because in present times, questions about financial mismanagement, self-dealing, conflicts of 
interest, and public disclosure are as likely to be raised about religious organizations as about 
secular ones (Hall 2002 ; Tsafe & Rahman, 2013).  
A limited number of studies have explored the impact of religious affiliation on the management 
and governance of economic organizations in general. However, a review of the extant literature 
on management and governance outcomes of faith-based organizations reveals some important 
findings. For example, Knox, Blankmeyer, and Stutzman (2006) in a study on the relative 
economic efficiency in the nursing industry in Texas, identified significant differences in 
economic efficiency among religious-affiliated and private secular facilities. Their findings 
revealed that, though quality appears to be homogeneous, private secular facilities are 
significantly more efficient than religious-affiliated homes.  
2.4  Previous empirical research findings  
In the microfinance and the general corporate governance literature, several studies have been 
conducted on how various corporate governance systems and structures affect firm performance. 
In relation to board composition, Jensen (1993) suggests that agency costs rises with board size. 
He argues that as board size increases beyond seven or eight, free-rider problems intensifies, and 
board effectiveness declines. Yermack (1996) finds out that, large board size has a significant 
negative impact on a company‟s Tobin‟s Q. Similarly, in a study related to MFIs in Eastern 
Europe, Hartarska (2005) found evidence to suggest that larger board size reduces firm‟s 
financial performance. Concerning board diversity, although Oxelheim and Randøy (2003), had 
earlier found that firm performance improves with the presence of international directors, 
Mersland & Strøm (2009) found that in MFIs, firm performance improves with local rather than 
international directors. Concerning, the issue of CEO duality, Mersland & Strøm (2009) found 
that, the number of credit clients increases with CEO/chairman duality. However, Hartarska & 
Mersland (2012) as well as Kyereboah-Coleman and Osei (2008) found evidence to suggest that, 
CEO duality is negatively correlated with MFI‟s outreach and financial performance. Besides, an 
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earlier study by Hartarska (2005) suggests that, a more independent board gives better financial 
results. In relation to ownership structure, Mersland & Strøm (2008; 2009) could not find 
significant differences in financial and outreach performance across ownership types implying 
that in MFIs, ownership structure does not have a significant influence on performance. 
Mersland & Strøm (2009) as well as Hartarska & Mersland, (2012) could not find any strong 
impact of external bank regulations on MFI performance. Concerning the issue of women on 
board, O'Regan and Oster (2005) could not find strong evidence to suggest that gender 
essentially matters when it comes to performance. Also, Hartarska (2005) could not find any 
significance of female directors on board performance. However, later studies by Mersland & 
Strøm (2009) found that, financial performance improves with a female CEO. Again, a more 
recent investigation by Hartarska et al. (2014) reveals that in less-developed markets, MFIs with 
female CEOs have higher outreach efficiency and that promoting diversity at the management 
level is likely to have social and financial benefits. Moreover, the study by Mersland & Strøm 
(2009) revealed that, an MFI‟s financial performance could be improved by the presence of an 
internal board auditor. Nonetheless, Thomson and Conyon (2012) commented that, though 
auditing and accounting practices play a vital role in enhancing transparency and reducing 
information asymmetry, current trends in the secular business world reveals that, auditors who 
are paid by companies are motivated to accommodate the wishes of company managers for 
creative accounting owing to market competition. If this view by Thomson & Conyon (2012) is 
real, then the implication is that, the governance role external audit will be rendered ineffective 
in the secular business world. While the above empirical findings and propositions does not give 
a clear picture of how these governance variables will influence or be influenced by whether an 
MFI has a Christian affiliation or not, the study tries to combine insights from theory and 
empirical research findings to make predictions to that effect. This is represented in the 
hypotheses section thus section 3.3 below. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3.  Theories and Research Hypotheses 
3.1  Definition of Corporate Governance 
All forms organizations have some systems of governance in place be it formal or informal. The 
revised principles of corporate governance issued by Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development (OECD, 2004, p. 11), defines corporate governance as „a set of relationships 
between a company‟s management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders which 
provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of 
attaining those objectives are determined”. Labie and Mersland (2011 p. 3) also defined 
corporate governance as “a system, or a set of mechanisms, by which an organization is directed 
and controlled in order to reach its mission and objectives”. Labie and Mersland (2011) indicated 
that in relation to the microfinance industry, governance mechanisms can be defined internally 
by the MFI itself or externally. The internal governance factors are those related to the MFI 
board and include its size, representations by various stakeholders, managerial capture, auditing, 
CEO compensation etc. (Hartarska & Mersland, 2012; Labie and Mersland, 2011). The external 
factors account for the weak market-disciplining mechanisms in microfinance, such as a lack of 
private shareholders, the limited role of competition, and differences in regulation. 
3.2  Basic Theories of Governance 
Agency theory 
Corporate governance problems are not new. Economists have long recognized that conflicts of 
interest can arise in the direction and control of companies. Smith (1776 p.700), in his book „The 
Wealth of Nations‟, knew the central governance problem and wrote: “The directors of such 
companies, however, being the managers rather of peoples’ money than of their own, it cannot 
be well that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with which the partners in 
a private copartnery frequently watch over their own. Like the stewards of a rich man, they are 
apt to consider attention to small matters as not for their master’s honor, and very easily give 
themselves a dispensation from having it. Negligence and profusion, therefore, must always 
prevail, more or less, in the management of the affairs of such a company”. “The basic corporate 
governance problem from a theoretical perspective, then, is the so-called „agency problem‟ 
which occurs because of the separation between ownership and management” (Thomson & 
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Conyon, 2012, p. 6). This is also termed as the „separation of ownership and control‟ by Berle 
and Means (1932). In their quest to find out how organizations could survive under such 
situation, Fama and Jensen (1983 p. 301-302) came to contend that separation of decision and 
risk-bearing functions survives in these organizations in part because of the benefits of 
specialization of management and risk bearing but also because of an effective common 
approach to controlling the agency problems caused by separation of decision and risk-bearing 
functions. Generally, they argued that, “the contract structures of all of these organizations 
separate the ratification and monitoring of decisions from initiation and implementation of the 
decisions.” However, Fama and Jensen (1983 p. 304) indicated that, “agency problems arise 
because contracts are not costlessly written and enforced.” Agency costs include the costs of 
structuring, monitoring and bonding a set of contracts among agents with conflicting interests 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976 pp. 308-309). Agency costs also include the value of output lost 
because the costs of full enforcement of contracts exceeds the benefits (i.e. residual loss), 
(Jegers, 2009; Puyvelde, Caers, Du Bois & Jegers, 2012). Thomson and Conyon (2012 p.6) 
nonetheless observed that, in the real world of course, there are more than two actors (principal 
and agent), so the picture becomes much more complicated. They observed that, between owners 
and managers, there is a board elected by the owners purposely to monitor and control the 
managers on their behalf. They also noted that, the owners of a firm do not necessarily comprise 
a homogeneous group. There may be many or few owners. Some owners may be private 
individuals, institutional investors, mutual funds etc. Again, most firms have stakeholders with 
whom they do business and who can directly and indirectly influence their corporate governance. 
These include banks, suppliers, employees, customers, governments, donors among others.  
 
Christopher (2010) also recognized that, in the real-world business environment, there exist some 
external and internal forces which are not normally captured in the contractual obligations 
between management and shareholders in an agency-oriented paradigm. These forces which 
arise from a range of issues such as specific legal and regulatory, social, ethical, human resource 
and behavioral issues tend to have an impact on governance (Christopher, 2010 p. 686).  This 
goes to suggest that considering only contractual relationship management as suggested by the 
proponents of agency theory, as a solution to the basic governance problem, may not be effective 
in all situations. This led to the proposition of the stewardship theory to complement the agency 
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theory in redefining the central governance problem and to make consequent adjustments to 
governance mechanisms and processes.    
 
Stewardship Theory 
Christopher (2010 p.689) indicated that, “ in addition to identifying the interdependencies 
between the multiple stakeholders in an organization and strategically managing them, there is an 
associated governance responsibility to operationally manage them on a daily basis through an 
appropriate set of skilled managers and governance processes.” This operational level 
management, he argued, requires a high level of professionalism from the staff at the various 
level of management. But how could this professional attitude towards work be obtained? 
Christopher (2010 p.689) was of the view that, “in addition to the staff‟s own professional and 
ethical guidelines, other influences such as sociological, ethical, or cultural values which could 
be country- or organization-specific, could also assist towards determining the element of trust 
that can be placed with the management of organizations.” The presence of the environmental 
influencing forces he argued would in turn determine the type of governance monitoring and 
control mechanisms to be implemented. He further noted that, in organizational contexts where 
such sociological, cultural and ethical values are very influential, the costs of control will be less 
as there will be a need to introduce more intrinsic and empowering processes instead of extrinsic 
rewards and processes in order to make governance effective (Christopher 2010).  
 
Puyvelde et al. (2012) divided stewardship theory into two branches. The first branch 
acknowledges the potential conflict between the goals of the principal and the agent but assumes 
that the agent will be motivated to act in the interest of the principal (Davis, Schoorman, & 
Donaldson, 1997). The second branch also assumes that the agent‟s goals are perfectly aligned 
with those of the principal (Sundaramurthy & Lewis, 2003). This second assumption was taken 
from the perspectives of organizational identification which is defined by Mael and Ashforth 
(1992, p. 103) as “a perceived oneness with an organization and the experience of the 
organization‟s successes and failures as one‟s owns.” Puyvelde et al. (2012 p. 436) argue that, 
“while agency theory assumes that agents have a low identification with the mission of the 
organization and may externalize organizational problems to avoid blame, stewardship theory in 
contrast, assumes that agents have a high identification with the mission of the organization”.  
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Besley and Ghatak (2005) also referred to employees in mission-oriented sector as motivated 
agents who pursue goals because they perceive intrinsic benefits from doing so. The motivated 
agency model according to (Besley & Ghatak, 2005 p. 625) “emphasizes why those who care 
about a particular cause are likely to end up as employees in mission-oriented nonprofits”. This 
finds support in, Weisbrod (1988, p. 32) who observes that, “Non-profit organizations may act 
differently from private firms not only because of the constraint on distributing profit but also, 
perhaps, because the motivations and goals of managers and directors in the two firms differ”. 
Weisbrod (1988 p.32) further argued that, “if some non-profits attract managers whose goals are 
different from those managers in the proprietary sector, the two types of organizations will 
behave differently”. 
3.3  The Research Hypotheses and Conceptual Framework 
This section presents the hypotheses regarding the differences in corporate governance systems 
and structures between Christian and Secular MFIs. First, a general hypothesis is given for the 
expected difference in governance between Christian and secular MFIs at an aggregate level. 
Then specific hypotheses for the individual governance variables are also given afterward. The 
hypotheses will be framed based on the perceived relative strictness of the governance systems in 
place in the two institutions. This will be done by taking into consideration the basic objectives 
of the two institutions and their guiding principles. Also, the hypotheses will be informed by the 
basic theories of corporate governance alongside empirical research findings on corporate 
governance mechanisms and performance.  
 
The General Hypotheses 
As already noted, agency theory suggests that whenever there is a separation between owners 
and the managers of a company, there need to be some mechanisms in place to monitor and 
control managerial behavior (Fama and Jensen, 1983). Boards are elected by shareholders with 
the main aim to address corporate governance issues. Boards deal with moral hazard by 
monitoring managers and motivating them through incentives like „stock options‟ and sanctions 
like „dismissal‟ (Thomson and Conyon, 2012). According Thomsen and Conyon (2012 p. 147) 
“boards have an extra role of providing consulting and networking services to companies and 
these are stressed by the stewardship and resource dependence theories.” Therefore, in the 
context of the Christian MFI, it could be presumed that, principals who are mostly Christian 
15 
 
NGOs will be more likely to appoint boards who share their basic Christian principles in order to 
ensure utmost good care. In turn, the boards of Christian MFIs are also likely to appoint 
managers who share their vision to a greater extent. Cornforth (2003 p.217) found support for 
this argument that “boards are more effective if the board and management share a common 
vision on how to achieve their goals.” Considering this point by Cornforth (2003) from the 
perspectives of stewardship theory as explained above, one can assume that agents in Christian 
MFIs will have high organizational identification which could imply that Christian MFIs will 
need less-strict governance systems. Furthermore, if agents in Christian MFIs (Boards and 
Managers) were to follow the basic Christian ideologies of their Christian principals, then one 
can argue that, governance in Christian MFIs will be more efficient and effective all things  
equal. For instance, in Colossians 3:23 the bible says that, “Whatever you do, work at it with all 
your heart, as working for the Lord, not for human masters.” Again, in Mark 12:31 Jesus asserts 
that, “the second important commandment is to love one’s neighbor as him or herself.”  These 
bible references suggest that if Christian agents were to follow the doctrines in the bible to the 
letter, they would undoubtedly be better stewards than their secular counterparts because agency 
costs would be lower under such circumstances.  
 
Moreover, a critical look at some biblical parables indicates that Christian agents are expected to 
be better stewards than their secular counterparts even though this may not be explicitly written. 
For instance in Matthew 25:14-30, the bible tells a parable about a master and his three servants 
to whom the master had left some talents before he embarked on a journey. In this story, the 
bible does not tell whether the master had given the servants any specific instructions as to how 
they should use the talents or not. But in the end, the story tells that upon his return, while the 
master praised two of the servants who were self-motivated, hardworking and fruitful, he 
condemned the other servant who did not put his talent into any use. This parable seems to create 
the picture that, Christian organizations are likely to have a-more implicitly-strict governance 
than secular organizations. Following this line of reasoning, I present two rival general 
hypotheses as follows; 
 
HA1: Christian MFIs have less strict governance than secular MFIs.  
HA2: Christian MFIs have more strict governance than secular MFIs.  
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These general hypotheses are tested using twelve different governance variables as dependent 
variables. These include a dummy for NGO or a cooperative type of ownership, dummy for bank 
regulations, board size, board meetings per year, number international directors, number of 
female directors, dummy for female CEO, dummy for CEO duality, number of top management 
members, dummy for the use of services of the big four external auditors (see table 4-3), 
dummies for CEO‟s formal business education and business experience. Following is the 
hypotheses for the effect of religious affiliation on the respective variables.  
 
i.   Christian MFIs and NGO or a Cooperative ownership structure 
The theory of ownership cost suggests that Shareholder-owned firms are better at minimizing 
ownership cost from the practice of ownership (Mersland & Strøm, 2008). However, NGOs 
according to (Hansmann, 1996), are also better at mitigating ownership costs stemming from 
market-based contracts because they have better access to information and are less likely to 
encounter the problem of adverse selection. Besides just as NGOs are expected to be more 
socially-oriented than profit-oriented (Ebrahim, 2003; Ashta & Bush, 2009) so are Christian-
affiliated organizations also expected to have more social orientation than secular organizations 
(Mersland et al., 2013 p.147). This implies that, to a greater extent, Christian MFIs share some of 
the major goals of NGOs than secular MFIs. From this line of reasoning, it could be 
hypothesized that, 
 
H1: The probability for having an NGO or a Cooperative ownership structure is higher in 
Christian MFIs than secular MFIs. 
 
ii.   Christian MFIs and Bank Regulations 
Thomsen and Conyon (2012 p.50) noted that „legal protection of shareholder rights is very 
important and that the law obligates companies to many practices which protect the rights of 
investors. Therefore, a similar inference could be made that, the essence of bank regulations is to 
streamline the activities of banks and other financial institutions in order to protect the rights of 
investors, customers, governments and other stakeholders. Other authors have also identified 
that, governments have over the years provided religiously-tied service providers with direct and 
indirect subsidies including regulatory reliefs such as tax exemptions and deductible donations 
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(Hall 2002 pp. 1-2; Forren, 2006) Also, comparing Christian MFIs to the secular MFIs, one can 
assume that secular MFIs would have more private investors with monetary incentives than 
Christian MFIs. Again, looking at this from the perspective of stewardship theory, it could be 
assumed that, if agents in Christian MFIs are to have their goals aligned better with their 
financiers, there will be less need for bank regulations. Henceforth, it could be hypothesized that, 
 
H2: The probability for Christian MFIs being regulated by banking authorities in a country is 
less than secular MFIs. 
 
iii.   Christian MFIs and Number of International Directors 
Mersland, Randøy and Strøm (2011 p.164-165), indicated that, the microfinance industry is 
international in scope with heavy investments by international banking and lending institutions. 
Mersland et al. (2013 p.148) also noted that, several international lenders and support 
organizations for MFIs such one of the world‟s largest, Oikocredit, have a Christian origin. 
Besley and Ghatak (2005 p. 617) also asserts that “a person would find donating his or her 
income earned in the market to an organization that pursues a mission that he or she cares about 
to be an imperfect substitute for joining and working in it”. Reconciling this view by Besley and 
Ghatak (2005) to the fact that many Christian MFIs are initiated and financed by international 
Christian organizations (Mersland et al., 2013), it could be hypothesized that, 
 
H3: Christian MFIs have a larger number of international directors than secular MFIs. 
 
iv.   Christian MFIs and CEO Business Experience and Education 
Cornforth (2003) found that, in order to enhance board effectiveness, board members must have 
the time, relevant skills and experience to do the job and in addition, there must be clear board 
roles and responsibilities. Mersland et al. (2013) observed that, although several psychological 
studies have identified a positive influence of religion on economic efficiency, the other side of 
the coin is that, religious leaders and workers may pursue goals that are not related to 
organizational performance. For instance, “some authors argue that Christian MFIs should have a 
triple bottom-line; financial results, social results, and spiritual results and that for instance, high 
client/staff efficiency ratios are incompatible with the achievement of spiritual results” (Bussau 
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& Mask, 2003 cited Mersland et al., 2013 p.148). In line with  this tendency for spiritual focus, 
Mersland et al. (2013) argued that, Christian MFIs can employ managers who have a good 
spiritual background by their standards but may not necessary have the relevant educational 
background and business experience. From this point of argument, I present the following two 
hypotheses;  
 
H4: The probability for having a CEO who has business experience is lesser in Christian MFIs 
than secular MFIs 
H5: The probability for having a CEO who has a university business education is lesser in 
Christian MFIs than secular MFIs 
 
v.   Christian MFIs and Board size, Board meetings and Top Management size 
Most studies on the effects of board size on firm performance points to the fact that, larger board 
sizes are less effective and negatively affects performance (e.g. Yermack, 1996; Eisenberg, 
Sundgren & Wells, 1998; Conyon & Peck, 1998). Also, when it comes to the Microfinance 
industry, Hartarska (2005) found that, larger boards lead to low financial sustainability. 
However, Oster & O‟Regan (2003 cited Hartarska, 2005) hypothesized in NPOs, board size may 
need to be larger due to the extra duties of board members related to supervision of fundraising 
which was later confirmed in their subsequent studies that, indeed large board size is associated 
with positive performance features in the nonprofit sector (O‟Regan & Oster, 2005 p. 226). 
Considering the fact that Christian MFIs largely depend on donor support than secular MFIs 
(Mersland et al., 2013), it could be inferred that, Christian MFIs would have a larger number of 
board members, more top management members and more board meetings per annum. 
Accordingly, the following hypotheses are made; 
 
H6:  Christian MFIs have a larger board size than secular MFIs. 
H7:  Christian MFIs have more top management members than secular MFIs 
H8:  Christian MFIs have higher number of board meetings per year than secular MFIs 
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vi.   Christian MFIs and The Big Four External Auditors  
Mersland et al. (2013) found evidence to suggest that, Christian MFIs have a lower cost of 
funding compared to secular MFIs and hinted that, a possible cause for this discrepancy could be 
because most Christian MFIs are heavily dependent on donor support. Mersland (2011 p. 337) 
also indicated that, donors in general practice slack control and are seldom active in corporate 
governance. Henceforth, it could be predicted that, since the purpose of external audit is to assure 
external stakeholders, especially private investors who continuously seek an appreciable return 
on their investments, of the genuineness of a company‟s financial information, secular MFIs are 
more likely to be influenced by investor demands to ensure a better quality of external audit and 
hence be more likely to employ the services of the big four external auditors (see Table 4-3). 
This notwithstanding, Kitching (2009) also examined the link between auditing and donations 
decisions using a sample of U.S charitable organizations. By using audit firm size as a proxy for 
audit quality, she finds that audit quality affects donor-giving decisions. She found that donors 
are willing to give more to nonprofit organizations audited by a high-quality auditor and that 
donors are more sensitive to changes in reported accounting information verified by a high-
quality auditor (Kitching, 2009, p. 510). Therefore, by reconciling the findings by Mersland et al. 
(2013) to that of Kitching (2009), I formulate two rival hypotheses as follows; 
 
H9a: Christian MFIs have a lesser tendency to use the services of the big four external auditors 
than Secular MFIs. 
H9b: Christian MFIs have a higher tendency to use the services of the big four external auditors 
than Secular MFIs. 
 
vii.   Christian MFIs and Females on Board and Management 
While conventional Christian beliefs and practices seem to make men superior over women, and 
generally discourages women leadership, other empirical observations on the role of women on 
MFI boards and management have proved that, having women as CEO of MFIs could lead to 
better outreach performance (Hartarska et al., 2014). Besides, Mersland et al. (2013) 
hypothesized that; Christian MFIs by virtue of the fact that they have a higher poverty 
orientation should perform better in outreach to poor clients. However, this hypothesis was not 
empirically supported and considering the changing trends even within the Christian religion for 
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instance, the call for proactiveness by Protestantism (Weber, 1958) which is not gender-biased, it 
is not clear-cut as to the prevailing trend in terms of having more or fewer females on board and 
management of Christian MFIs. To this end I hypothesize that, 
 
H10a Christian MFIs have more female directors than Secular MFIs. 
H10b Christian MFIs have less female directors than Secular MFIs. 
 
H11a The probability for having a female CEO is higher in Christian MFIs than Secular MFIs 
H11b The probability for having a female CEO is lesser in Christian MFIs than Secular MFIs 
 
viii.    Christian MFIs and CEO/Chairman Duality 
Concerning the issue of CEO duality, thus a situation, where the CEO doubles as the board chair, 
it has been suggested that this increases agency costs (Thomsen & Conyon, 2012 p. 143). 
Thomsen and Conyon (2012 p. 143) argues that “while CEO duality is very common in the US, 
it is very rare in United Kingdom (UK) although these countries share similar governance 
structures (e.g. common law, one-tier board system etc.).” They however, noted that, this 
difference is partly due to cultural and institutional differences and that this is because the UK‟s 
corporate governance code emphasizes board independence. Hence the separation of the 
positions in the UK is to enhance an effective separation of powers. Considering the case 
between the Christian and the secular MFIs, one can assume that, Christian MFIs from the 
perspectives of stewardship theory will not be too strict to have the two positions separated. 
Mersland and Strøm, (2009), also held a similar opinion that, “even though CEO/chairman 
duality may be a sign of CEO entrenchment, it may enhance effective decision making especially 
in a situation where there is a smaller divergence between the interest of the CEO and the owner” 
(Allen and Gale, 2000 cited Mersland and Strøm, 2009 pp. 663-664). However, Mersland et al. 
(2013) noted that, most Christian MFIs are founded by international Christian NGOs. Therefore, 
if the notion by Thomsen and Conyon that CEO duality is culturally-influenced holds, then the 
probability for a Christian MFI having a CEO/chairman duality could also be influenced by the 
prevailing situation in the founding NGO‟s country which may not necessarily reflect the 
organizational characteristics of the Christian MFI. To this end I formulate two rival hypotheses 
that,   
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H12a The tendency of having the positions of CEO and Board Chair occupied by the same person 
is higher in Christian MFIs compared to Secular MFIs 
H12b The tendency of having the positions of CEO and Board Chair separated is higher in 
Christian MFIs compared to Secular MFIs 
 
In line with the empirical arguments outlined above, and also drawing the appropriate inferences 
from agency and stewardship theory perspectives, the conceptual framework represented in the 
figure 3-1 below, is modeled after the expected impact of Christian affiliation on the corporate 
governance variables selected for this study. 
 
Figure 3-1 The Conceptual Framework 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
4.  Data Description and Methodology 
4.1  Data and Sample Description 
This study uses data relating to 403 rated MFIs operating in 73 countries worldwide. A list of 
countries and the number of MFIs could be found in Table 4-1, shown in the next page. The data 
have been extracted from detailed risk assessment reports produced by five specialized rating 
agencies. The rating agencies are MicroRate, Microfinanza, Planet Rating, Crisil and M-Cril. 
These five agencies were selected because they are well endowed with information and are the 
largest players when it comes to MFI rating. Moreover, the agencies are officially approved by 
the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (C-GAP) and are supported by the C-GAP‟s Rating 
Fund. The source of information based on which the data was extracted is publicly available at 
www.ratingfund2.org.  
 
The rating reports making up the database are from years 2001 to 2010, with the majority 
coming from 2004 to 2008. For this study, the source of information is essential because the 
reports contain detailed information regarding the background of the MFIs and allow one to 
identify whether an MFI has a religious origin. The data have a certain sample selection bias, 
since only rated MFIs are entered. However, of the rated MFIs, most rating categories are 
represented in the data. Besides, this selection has advantages since much of the background 
“noise” has been eliminated by only including MFIs that are able and willing to be rated. Again 
the fact that other writers such as (Mersland and Strøm, 2009; Mersland et al., 2013) have 
published articles in well reputed journals using a comprehensive data set based on rating reports 
makes this approach well recognized. 
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Table 4-1  List of Countries and number of Microfinance Institutions 
Country 
Code 
Name of Country No. of 
MFIs 
Country 
Code 
Name of Country No. of 
MFIs 
1 Albania 3 39 Russian Federation 15 
2 Argentina 1 40 Senegal 10 
3 Armenia 3 41 South Africa 3 
4 Benin 9 42 Sri Lanka 1 
5 Bolivia 15 43 Tanzania 5 
6 Bosnia Herzegovina 12 44 Togo 4 
7 Brazil 13 45 Trinidad and Tobago 1 
8 Bulgaria 2 46 Tunisia 1 
9 Burkina Faso 4 47 Uganda 10 
10 Cambodia 13 48 Montenegro 2 
11 Chile 2 49 Cameroun 5 
12 Colombia 6 50 Guinea 1 
13 Dominican Republic 4 51 East Timor 1 
14 Ecuador 18 52 Bangladesh 2 
15 Egypt 5 53 Nepal 5 
16 El Salvador 6 54 Vietnam 1 
17 Ethiopia 10 55 Azerbaijan 7 
18 Georgia 6 56 Mongolia 2 
19 Guatemala 6 57 Nigeria 3 
20 Haiti 3 58 Mozambique 1 
21 Honduras 8 59 Tajikistan 7 
22 India 32 60 Croatia 1 
23 Indonesia 2 61 Chad 1 
24 Jordan 3 62 Rwanda 4 
25 Kazakhstan 4 63 Zambia 2 
26 Kenya 9 64 China 1 
27 Kyrgyzstan 4 65 Serbia 1 
28 Madagascar 2 66 Ghana 4 
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29 Mali 3 67 Malawi 1 
30 Mexico 18 68 Gambia 1 
31 Moldova 2 69 Kosovo 4 
32 Morocco 6 70 Rep of Congo Brazz. 1 
33 Nicaragua 13 71 Burundi 1 
34 Pakistan 1 72 Niger 3 
35 Paraguay 2 73 DRC- Kinshasa 1 
36 Peru 32    
37 Philippines 7    
38 Romania 1    
Total Number of  Countries                                                                                               403                                                                                                                            
Table developed by Author from panel data set. 
 
4.2  Operationalization and measurement of concepts 
Zikmund, Babin, Carr, and Griffin (2013) noted that, researchers measure concepts through a 
process known as operationalization. This process involves identifying scales that correspond to 
variance in the concept. According to (Sager 1976 cited Pascal, 2012) the operational definition 
or research definition is the definition of the concept which its properties or operations can be 
measured through observation. For non-observable operational definition, their events, presence 
or absence of behavior can be measured by inferring to the behavior that is observable (Pascal, 
2012, p. 15). This study operationalizes the following concepts based on theories and empirical 
research findings.  
 
In this study, dependent variables such as board size (B-size), number of board meetings per 
annum (B-mtyr), number of female directors (fem-dirs),  a dummy for a female CEO (f-CEO), 
number of international directors (Int-dirs), a dummy for CEO duality (C-dty), dummies for 
CEO business experience and education (CB-exp/CB-edu), number of top management team (T-
mgt), a dummy for use of the services of „the big four external auditors‟ (B4-audit), a dummy for 
whether an MFI is regulated by banking authorities in a country (BK-reg) and a dummy for 
ownership status (NGO/Coop) are used to measure the strictness of corporate governance in a 
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sample consisting of religious-affiliated and secular MFIs. The sole independent variable is the 
dummy for religious initiation (1 for religious initiated and, 0 for non-religious initiated).  
 
Besides, the study includes a set of control variables which have also been used recently in the 
MFI literature (e.g. Mersland et al., 2013). The control variables used in this study include MFI 
specific control variables such as MFI size which is measured by using the dollar value of assets 
as a proxy, MFI age and country-specific control variables such as the Human Development 
Index (HDI) of the country where the MFI is situated, the percentage of Christian population. 
Moreover, regional dummies for Latin America, Asia, Eastern Europe and Africa are included. 
These control variables will help to reduce the risk of attributing explanatory power to 
independent variables that in fact are not responsible for the occurrence of variation in the 
dependent variable (Zikmund et al., 2013 p. 262). These controls could also help reduce the error 
variance, and hence to increase the sensitivity with which religious or non-religious affiliation 
impact governance (Lord, 1960, p. 307).   
Table 4-2 summarizes the list of independent and control variables with their explanations while 
table 4-3 presents a combined schedule of the dependent variable and the expected correlations 
with the predictor variable.  
26 
 
Table 4-2 Explanations of Independent and control variables used in the 
study 
Independent Variable Explanation (measure) 
Religious Affiliation  
(Dm Rel-Init) 
A dummy with a value of (1) if the MFI has a Christian origin 
and with a value of (0) if the MFI has a secular origin 
MFI Specific Controls 
MFI size The dollar value of MFI‟s total assets  
MFI age Number of years elapse since the MFI started business up to the 
year  the information was gathered 
Contextual Controls 
Human Development Index 
( HDI) 
A composite statistic of life expectancy, education and income 
indices used to rank countries 
Regional Dummies Dummies for Latin America, Africa, Asia and Eastern Europe 
Percentage Christian 
Population 
The number of Christian residents as a percentage of the total 
country population 
Developed by Author 
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Table  4-3 Explanations for Dependent Variables and Hypothesis used in the 
study 
Dependent 
Variables 
(Governance 
Mechanisms) 
 
Explanation (Measure) 
Hypotheses 
Christian MFIs 
Type (legal 
status) 
A dummy for ownership with a value 
of 1 if the MFI is an NGO or a 
Cooperative (COOP) 
 
+ 
A greater number of Christian 
MFIs have an NGO or a 
Cooperative  ownership 
structure 
Bank Regulation A dummy variable with a value of 1 if 
the MFI is regulated by banking 
authorities in the country 
 
- 
A lesser number of Christian 
MFIs are regulated by banking 
authorities 
Board size States the number of board members  
+ 
Christian MFIs have a large 
board size 
International 
Director 
States the number of international 
board members 
 
+ 
Christian MFIs have a larger 
number of international 
directors 
Female Director States the number of female directors +/- Most Christian MFIs have 
either a large or small number 
of female directors 
DM Female 
CEO 
A dummy with a value of 1 if the  
MFI‟s Chief Executive Officer is a 
female 
 
  +/- 
Most Christian MFIs have 
either a female or non-female 
CEO  
Board Meet- 
year  
States the number of regular board 
meetings per year 
+ Christian MFIs have more 
board meetings per year 
DM CEO Chair A dummy with a value of 1 if the CEO 
and the board chair is the same person 
+/- Most Christian MFIs have, or 
do not have the same person as 
CEO and board chair 
DM CEO Bus. A dummy with a value of 1 if the CEO - The CEO of most Christian 
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Experience has business experience MFIs does not have business 
experience  
DM CEO Bus 
Education. 
A dummy with a value of 1 if the CEO 
has a university business education 
- The CEO of most Christian 
MFIs does not have a 
university business education 
Top 
Management 
Team 
States the number of top management 
members 
+ Christian MFIs have a larger 
number of top management 
members 
DM The Big 4 
External 
Auditors 
A dummy with a value of 1 if the MFI 
employs the services of The Big Four 
External Auditors including 
PricewaterhouseCoopers, KPMG, 
Ernest & Young and Deloitte. These 
are named the big 4 because they 
come to the top in the global ranking 
of accounting firms considering their 
range of services, profit margin, 
employee size and global recognition. 
( accountingverse.com)  
 
+/- 
Most Christian MFIs do, or do 
not employ the services  of the 
big four external auditors 
Developed by Author 
 
4.3 The Research Methods 
Towards the achievement of the objectives for this study, I first perform a univariate t- and χ2- 
tests that analyzes the differences in mean and median respectively between the two groups (thus 
Christian/secular MFIs) in the different hypothesized governance variables. The t-test represents 
a test for hypotheses which compares the mean scores for two groups comprised of some 
interval- or ratio-scaled variable using a less-than interval classificatory variable (Zikmund et al., 
2013 p.534). The χ2-test is also appropriate for univariate tests involving two nominal or ordinal 
variables (Zikmund et al., 2013 p.521). In addition, by using the panel data model, I regress the 
different corporate governance variables against the predictor variable (dummy for Christian 
affiliation) as well as the set of control variables. 
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A panel data set is one that follows a given sample of individuals overtime, and thus provides 
multiple observations on each individual in the sample (Hsiao, 2003, p. 1). Hsiao (2003) 
remarked that, panel data sets for economic research possess several major advantages over 
traditional cross-sectional or time-series data sets. For instance „panel data usually give the 
researcher a large number of data points, increasing the degrees of freedom and reducing the 
collinearity among explanatory variables- hence improving the efficiency of econometric 
estimates‟ (Hsiao, 2003 p.1). Moreover, since the panel data provides a relationship, over time to 
individual (e.g. MFIs), this implies that these individuals are bound to be heterogeneous (Pascal, 
2012). The panel data estimation takes into consideration such heterogeneity by allowing 
individual-specific (MFI) variables to be tested (Studenmund, 2006 cited Pascal, 2012).  Halaby 
(2004, p. 508) noted that, “the fundamental structure of panel data provides the analytical 
leverage for rigorously achieving the central aim of quantitative research: the estimation of 
causal effects”. 
According to Halaby (2004), the problem of causal inference is primarily one of unobservables, 
and unobservables are central to the contribution of panel data in solving problems of causal 
inference. Two kinds of unobservables pose a challenge in the identification and estimation of 
causal parameters in nonrandomized studies: (a) time-invariant unit-specific unobservables that 
represent permanent properties of units (i.e., unit effects) and (b) time-varying unit-specific 
unobservables that represent transitory and idiosyncratic forces acting upon units (i.e., 
disturbances) (Halaby, 2004, p. 508). Panel data offer certain privileges for dealing with such 
abstracts, but these advantages can only be realized through statistical methods that capitalize on 
the structure of observations that extend across units and over time (Halaby, 2004; Park, 2011).  
 
The following is general panel data regression model according to (Bollen and Brand, 2010 cited 
Pascal, 2012).  
           
            
Where;  
        Represent the dependent variable (measure of corporate governance system/structure) for 
cross- section unit i at time t, where i = 1…..n and t = 1…..T   
        Represent heterogeneity or an individual effect which comprises the constant term in the 
model, and it contains set of observable individual or group specific variables for example MFI‟s 
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type etc. or unobserved MFI characteristics ( for instance composition of governance structure 
within the MFI) which are generally considered time invariant ( Wooldridge, 2006 cited Pascal, 
2012). 
      Represent the partial effect measure of      in time t for unit i 
      Represent the j
th 
predictor variable for unit i at the time t. In this study there are K predictor 
variables indexed by j=1……K which means that      is a K dimensional vector and; 
      Represent the error term 
4.3.1  Fixed vs. Random Effect Models  
Two main techniques are used in panel data analysis, fixed effects and random effects models. 
The fixed effects model assumes that, in exploring the relationship between the predictor and 
outcome variables within an entity (country, individual or an organization), time invariant 
characteristics within such entities (e.g. gender, race, religion, political system) may bias the 
predictor or outcome variables and needs to be controlled. Fixed effect models thus remove the 
effect of all those time-invariant characteristics from the predictor variables so we can assess the 
predictor‟s net effect (Torres-Reyna n.d.1).  
 
On the contrary, the random effects model assumes that the variation across entities is random 
and uncorrelated with the predictor or independent variables included in the model. Random 
effects assume that the entity‟s error term is not correlated with the predictors which allows for 
the time-invariant variables to play a role as explanatory variables . Accordingly, considering the 
time-invariant nature of some of the covariates, I use the random effects model for this study. 
The random effect model assumes that the individual effect       is not correlated with the 
predictor variable      hence the error term in random effects model becomes (   +    ), whereby 
   is the specific random effects element for the group which is similar to     except that with    , 
for every group there is a single draw that is considered into the regression identically for each 
time (Gujarati and Porter, 2010; Wooldridge, 2006 cited Pascal, 2012, Torres-Reyna, n.d.). 
 
Therefore, the random effects model adapted from the general model could be represented as: 
 
           
               
                                                          
1 n.d. refers to no date found 
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Where;  
    Represents the between-entity error and 
    Represents the within-entity error (Torres-Reyna, n.d.) 
 
Operational models for the general equation above are presented in the regression section. 
 
4.4  The Regression Model 
In this study, I use both Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and Logistic regression models in my 
regression analysis considering the fact the dependent variables for this study are composed of 
continuous and categorical variables. According to Park (2011, p. 7) „if individual effects    
(cross-sectional or time specific effect) does not exist (    ), OLS produces efficient and 
consistent parameters.‟ OLS consists of five core assumptions (Greene, 2008 cited Park, 2011). 
These include; 
1. Linearity: asserts that the dependent variable is formulated as a linear function of a set of 
independent variable and the error (disturbance) term. 
2. Exogeneity: indicates that the expected value of disturbances is zero or disturbances are 
not correlated with any regressors. 
3. Disturbances have the same variance (homoscedasticity) and are not related with one 
another (no autocorrelation) 
4. The observations on the independent variable are not stochastic but fixed in repeated 
samples without measurement errors. 
5. Full rank assumes that there is no exact linear relationship among independent variables 
(no multicollinearity). 
However, Park (2011 p.7) indicated that, if individual effect    is not zero in longitudinal data, 
heterogeneity (individual specific characteristics that are not captured in regressors) may 
influence assumptions 2 and 3. Specifically, disturbances may not have the same variance but 
vary across individual (Heteroscedasticity, violation of assumption 3.a) or are related with each 
other (autocorrelation, violation of assumption 3.b). The violation of assumption 2 renders 
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random effect estimators biased. Therefore, the OLS2 estimator is no longer best unbiased linear 
estimator. Then panel data models provide a way to deal with these problems.  
 
Logistic regression models differ from linear regression models such as OLS in the use of a 
dichotomous dependent variable. Logistic analysis do not predict whether an event has occurred 
or not, but instead predicts the probability of the event (Hair, Black, Babin & Anderson, 2010 pp. 
317-319). In logistic regression models, the independent variables X’s can be numerical or 
categorical, but the dependent variables Y’s are generally coded as 0 (for those who do not have 
the event) or 1 (for those who have the event) (“Logistic Reg. Analysis”, 2012). The simple 
logistic model is based on a linear relationship between the natural logarithm (ln) of the odds of 
an event and a numerical independent variable. The form of this relationship is as follows: 
            (
 
   
)               , 
where  
Y is binary and represent the event of interest (response), coded as 0/1 for failure/success 
respectively 
p is the proportion of successes, 
o is the odds of the event, 
L is the ln (odds of event), 
X is the independent variable, 
   and    are the Y- intercept and the slope, respectively, and 
  is the random error (“Logistic Reg. Analysis”, 2012) 
 
The variables that are analysed using OLS in this thesis include; board size, board meetings per 
year, number of top management team, number of international directors and number of female 
directors. The rest are analysed by means of logistic regression. The operational regression 
models used in this study are presented as follows; (see next page)  
 
 
 
                                                          
2 The equation for the OLS model is equivalent to the general panel regression model presented above in p. 29. 
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i. Religious Affiliation and Board Size 
𝐵 − 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡   𝛽  + 𝛽 𝐷𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑙 − 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝛽2  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡   𝜇𝑖   𝜀𝑖𝑡…… …… (1) 
Where; 
𝐵 − 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 = Board size for MFI i at time t, where i=1.......n and t=1.......T 
𝐷𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑙 − 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡 = The dummy for religious Initiation of MFI 
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠 = Control variables (MFI size, age, HDI, regional dummies and percentage of Christian 
population) 
𝜇𝑖 = Unobserved heterogeneity MFI specific effect 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = The idiosyncratic errors as it vary across time t as well as across MFI i 
ii. Religious Affiliation and Board Meetings per year 
𝐵 − 𝑚𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑡   𝛽  + 𝛽 𝐷𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑙 − 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝛽2  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡   𝜇𝑖   𝜀𝑖𝑡……….. (2) 
Where; 
𝐵 − 𝑚𝑡𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑡 = No. of Board meetings per year for MFI i at time t 
iii. Religious Affiliation and No. of International Directors 
𝐼𝑛𝑡 − 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡   𝛽  + 𝛽 𝐷𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑙 − 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝛽2  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡   𝜇𝑖   𝜀𝑖𝑡……….. (3) 
Where; 
𝐼𝑛𝑡 − 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 = Number of International Directors for MFI i at time t  
iv. Religious Affiliation and No. of Top Management Team 
𝑇 − 𝑀𝑔𝑡𝑖𝑡   𝛽  + 𝛽 𝐷𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑙 − 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝛽2  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡   𝜇𝑖   𝜀𝑖𝑡……….. (4) 
Where; 
𝑇 − 𝑀𝑔𝑡𝑖𝑡 = Number of Top Management Team for MFI i at time t 
v. Religious Affiliation and No. of Female Directors 
𝐹𝑒𝑚 − 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡   𝛽  + 𝛽 𝐷𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑙 − 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝛽2  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡   𝜇𝑖   𝜀𝑖𝑡……….. (5) 
Where; 
𝐹𝑒𝑚 − 𝐷𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑖𝑡 = Number of Female Directors for MFI i at time t 
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vi. Religious Affiliation and Female CEO 
𝐹 − 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡   𝛽  + 𝛽 𝐷𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑙 − 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝛽2  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡   𝜇𝑖   𝜀𝑖𝑡…… …… (6) 
Where; 
𝐹 − 𝐶𝐸𝑂𝑖𝑡 = The probability that an MFI i at time t has a female CEO 
vii. Religious Affiliation and CEO Duality 
𝐶 − 𝑑𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡   𝛽  + 𝛽 𝐷𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑙 − 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝛽2  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡   𝜇𝑖   𝜀𝑖𝑡……….. ..(7) 
Where; 
𝐶 − 𝑑𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 = The probability that an MFI i at time t has the CEO and board chair as same person 
viii. Religious Affiliation and CEO Business Experience 
𝐶𝐵 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡   𝛽  + 𝛽 𝐷𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑙 − 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝛽2  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡   𝜇𝑖   𝜀𝑖𝑡……….. (8) 
Where; 
𝐶𝐵 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑖𝑡 = The probability that the CEO of an MFI i at time t has business experience 
ix. Religious Affiliation and CEO Business Education 
𝐶𝐵 − 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑡   𝛽  + 𝛽 𝐷𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑙 − 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝛽2  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡   𝜇𝑖   𝜀𝑖𝑡……….. (9) 
Where; 
𝐶𝐵 − 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑡 = The probability that the CEO of an MFI i at time t has a  university business education 
x. Religious Affiliation and the use of the Big Four Auditors 
𝐵4 − 𝑎𝑢𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡   𝛽  + 𝛽 𝐷𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑙 − 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝛽2  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡   𝜇𝑖   𝜀𝑖𝑡……….. (10) 
Where; 
𝐶𝐵 − 𝑒𝑑𝑢𝑖𝑡 = The probability that an MFI i at time t uses the services of the Big Four auditors. 
xi. Religious Affiliation and Bank Regulations 
𝐵𝐾 − 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡   𝛽  + 𝛽 𝐷𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑙 − 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝛽2  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡   𝜇𝑖   𝜀𝑖𝑡……….. (11) 
Where; 
𝐵𝐾 − 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑡 = The probability that an MFI i at time t regulated by the banking authorities in a country. 
xii. Religious Affiliation and NGO or cooperative ownership 
𝑁𝐺𝑂/𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡   𝛽  + 𝛽 𝐷𝑚𝑅𝑒𝑙 − 𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑡  𝛽2  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡   𝜇𝑖   𝜀𝑖𝑡……….. (12) 
Where; 
𝑁𝐺𝑂/𝑐𝑜𝑜𝑝𝑖𝑡 = The probability that an MFI i at time t is an NGO or a Cooperative 
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4.5  An Alternative Methodological Approach to Analysis 
In order to enhance the robustness of the regression results and also to improve upon the 
explanatory power of the regression results, I perform further analysis taking the dummy for 
religious initiation as dependent variable and the governance variables as the independent 
variables in a random effects logistic regression model. In order to do this, I perform some 
econometric analysis in order to test whether the model satisfies some of the fundamental 
assumptions of multiple regression analysis as outlined above and to make corrections where 
necessary.  
In the following subsections, I present and discuss how I managed to test and correct (where 
necessary) if any of these assumptions has been violated by the research model. I start by testing 
for Multicollinearity, Heteroscedasticity and then Normality of the error term.  
 
4.5.1 Correlation Analysis and the test for Multicollinearity 
According to Zikmund et al. (2013 p. 566), though simple regression and correlation are 
mathematically equivalent in most respects, regression is a dependence technique while 
correlation is an interdependence technique. A dependence technique makes a distinction 
between dependent and independent variables, specifying the cause and effect but an 
interdependence technique does not make this distinction and simply is concerned with how 
variables relate to one another. By means of STATA, I run correlation analysis to investigate if 
the independent variables are correlated. Multicollinearity is the undesirable situation where the 
correlations among the independent variables are very strong (chsbs.cmich.edu). 
Multicollinearity increases the standard errors of the coefficients (Mansfield & Helms, 1982) . 
Increased standard errors in turn means that coefficients for some independent variables may be 
found not to be significant while they should be otherwise significant (chsbs.cmich.edu). Hair et 
al. (2010 ) argue that the cut-off point is 0.9 correlation coefficient below which there is no effect 
of Multicollinearity. Using this 0.9 correlation coefficient as the cut-off point, it could be seen 
from the correlation matrix represented in the table 4-4 that there is no problem of 
Multicollinearity with the independent variables.  
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Table 4-4  Correlation Matrix 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
(1) NGO/Coop 1        
(2)BankRegul.      -0.36 1  
 
     
(3) Board Size 0.19 -0.04 1      
(4) Int. Directors. -0.26 0.21 0.05 1     
(5) Female Dirs 0.29 -0.04 0.37 -0.15 1    
(6) Female CEO 0.17 -0.01 0.10 -0.06 0.4 1   
(7) CEO Duality 0.09 -0.15 -0.22 -0.15 0.02 -0.01 1  
(8) CEO Bus Exp -0.25 0.06 0.03 0.15 -0.17 -0.02 0.14 1 
(9) Ext Auditors -0.05 0.12 0.12 0.25 -0.04 -0.06 -0.10 0.16 
(10) Ln Assets 0.00 0.08 0.22 0.17 -0.04 -0.00 -0.08 0.20 
(11)Age 0.27 -0.09 0.14 -0.15 0.09 -0.05 -0.08 -0.23 
(12) Int. Initiation -0.17 0.04 0.16 0.50 0.03 -0.09 -0.14 0.23 
(13) HDI 0.12 -0.48 -0.04 -0.18 0.01 0.22 0.15 -0.11 
(14) Lat. America 0.29 -0.21 -0.03 -0.24 0.00 0.09 -0.11 -0.09 
(15) Asia -0.33 0.21 -0.11 0.12 -0.06 -0.11 0.03 0.15 
(16) East Europe -0.06 -0.13 -0.03 0.21 0.02 0.07 0.08 -0.01 
(17) Africa 0.06 0.21 0.15 0.09 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 -0.04 
(18) Christ. Popl 0.37 -0.32 0.04 -0.22 0.19 0.15 0.08 -0.12 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
37 
 
 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
(9)Ext Auditors 1          
(10) Ln Assets 0.37 1         
(11)Age -0.06 0.28 1        
(12)Int. Initiation 0.23 0.18 -0.09 1       
(13) HDI -0.09 -0.05 -0.01 -0.11 1      
(14)Lat. America -0.17 0.00 0.30 -0.29 0.12 1     
(15) Asia 0.03 -0.05 -0.10 0.13 -0.13 -0.46 1    
(16) East Europe 0.18 0.02 -0.25 0.18 0.26 -0.49 -0.31 1   
(17) Africa -0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.06 -0.33 -0.24 -0.15 -0.16 1  
(18) Christ. Popl -0.14 -0.01 0.25 -0.19 0.39 0.58 -0.58 -0.01 -0.09 1 
 
As per the correlation matrix, the highest correlation coefficient among the predictor variables 
was recorded between an NGO or a Cooperative ownership type and bank regulation which was 
-0.36 and the second highest was between board size and the number of female directors which 
was also 0.37. Besides, some of the control variables also recorded significant correlation 
coefficients. For instance, in the case between the dummy for International initiation and the 
number of International directors, the correlation coefficient was 0.50. Also between the 
percentage of Christian population and the regional dummies for Latin America and Asia, the 
coefficients were 0.58 and -0.58 respectively. This result was obtained after omitting some of the 
independent variables (governance variables) that were highly correlated in an initial matrix 
(unreported). The variables that were omitted include, board meetings per year, number of top 
management team and the dummy for CEO business education. 
 
Multicollinearity could also be diagnosed using the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF). Mansfield 
and Helms (1982 p. 158), indicated that the VIFs reflect considerable variation in the extent of 
severity for the Multicollinearity. Accordingly, I use the collinearity diagnostics tool in STATA 
to compute the VIF values for the independent variables. As shown in the table 4-5 below, the 
VIF values are lower compared to the 10.0 cut-off point which also correspond to the 0.9 cut-off 
point for correlation coefficient suggested by Hair et al. (2010).  
 
38 
 
Table 4-5  Variance Inflation Factors 
Variable VIF Tolerance 
(1) NGO/Coop 1.65 0.61 
(2)BankRegul.      1.65 0.61 
(3) Board Size 1.53 0.65 
(4) Int. Directors. 1.62 0.62 
(5) Female Dirs 1.78 0.56 
(6) Female CEO 1.42 0.70 
(7) CEO Duality 1.31 0.76 
(8) CEO Bus Exp 1.41 0.71 
(9) Ext Auditors 1.31 0.76 
(10) Ln Assets 1.49 0.67 
(11)Age 1.48 0.67 
(12) Int. Initiation 1.60 0.62 
(13) HDI 2.01 0.50 
(14) Lat. America 9.97 0.10 
(15) Asia 6.96 0.14 
(16) East Europe 7.62 0.13 
(17) Africa 3.22 0.31 
(18) Christ. Popl 2.51 0.40 
Mean VIF 2.81  
 
In sum, the tests for Multicollinearity using the two well-known approaches in econometric 
analysis have proven, there is no serious problem of Multicollinearity with the independent 
variables used in this study. 
4.5.2  Test for Heteroscedasticity 
Heteroscedasticity is a situation which occurs when error variance is not constant across 
observations thereby violating the classical regression assumption of constant variance of the 
error term (Greene, 1993). According to Greene (1993 p.384), Heteroscedasticity occurs 
basically in the analysis of cross section data and sometimes arises as a result of data 
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aggregation. He further indicated that, „Heteroscedasticity if not corrected could result in biased 
standard errors of the Ordinary Least Squares‟ (OLS) (Greene, 1993 p. 391). To test for 
Heteroscedasticity, I use the Breusch-Pagan test, which tests the null hypothesis that there is no 
Heteroscedasticity across the range of independent variables. As shown in the table 4-6 below, 
the probability-value generated by STATA for the Heteroscedasticity test is highly significant 
indicating that the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity cannot be accepted. To correct for 
Heteroscedasticity, I run the regression with robust standard errors as suggested in most 
econometric literatures. 
 Table 4-6  Test for Heteroscedasticity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.5.3  Test for Normality of the Error term 
To test the normality of the error term, this study uses normal probability plot as suggested by 
Hair et al. (2010 p.185).With the exception of assets, all other variables were found to be 
normally distributed after verifying with the normal histogram syntax in STATA. To obtain 
normal distribution for assets, I used STATA to generate a log transformation of the variable 
which is shown in table 4-7 below. As depicted in the table 4-7 below, it could be seen that the 
graph for the transformed value of assets is more normally distributed than it was before the 
transformation. 
estat hettest 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity 
Ho: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of dm_rel_init 
 
chi2(1)      =   117.77 
Prob > chi2  =   0.0000 
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Table 4-7  Variable Transformation of MFI Size (assets) 
 
 
 
 
4.5.4  The operational model for the alternative approach 
As already mentioned, the alternative method seeks to regress the dummy for religious initiation 
against the governance variables now functioning as the independent variables. Again, I 
introduce another control variable thus the dummy for international initiation in the new 
approach to strengthen the effect of the control variables and in addition, reduce the number of 
the independent variables (governance variables) to improve upon efforts to reduce 
multicollinearity as suggested in Hair et al. (2010 p. 205).  
 
The regression equation for the new approach is given as follows: 
 
     −            +   −          2   −              −              −
              −               −            −              −         
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4.6  The Approach to Data Analysis 
In this thesis, I use both the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) and the STATA 
software packages for my econometric analysis. My choice for these data analysis tools was 
motivated by the popularity these software packages have gained in the business and economics 
literature for providing users the affordability to make informative and efficient statistical 
analysis. I also used them because the availability of online user guides for these software 
programs also made it easier to learn and apply them in my data analysis. 
 
CHAPTER FIVE 
5.  Presentation of Findings and Analysis 
This chapter presents the research findings as produced by the research design and the tools for 
data analysis. Section 5.1 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in the study. This 
is represented in table 5-1. Section 5.2 also analyses the results of the univariate statistics 
including t-statistics (mean values) and χ2 –statistics (median values). The results of the t- and χ2- 
tests are shown in Tables 5-2a and 5-2b respectively. This is followed by the results of the OLS 
regressions for the continuous dependent variables as well as the results for the Logistic 
regressions for the categorical dependent variables in section 5.3. Finally, in section 5.4, I extend 
the analysis by presenting the results for the alternative methodological approach which 
primarily checks for the robustness of the results produced by the other methods.   
 
5.1    Analysis of Study Variables 
As shown in the table 5-1 below, the value of total assets held by the median MFI in the sample 
is 2.67 (million dollars). Also, the age of the median MFI is 8 years. This result lends credence to 
the fact that, the microfinance industry is a relatively small and new industry. Also essential for 
this study, approximately 17% of the MFIs have a Christian origin and 64% are organized as 
NGOs or Cooperatives. Also, 39% of the MFIs have an international initiation. The board size of 
the median MFI is 4 and the number of board meetings per annum of the median MFI is 4. 
Furthermore, a significant number of the MFIs have CEOs with business experience and 
business education (85% and 64% respectively). However, the average numbers of international 
and female directors are very low (0.59 and 1.78 respectively). Moreover, a relatively small 
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proportion of the sampled MFIs (11%) have CEO duality. This could suggest that, most MFIs 
proportion of the sampled MFIs (11%) have CEO duality. This could suggest that, most MFIs 
are gradually adopting stricter and effective systems of corporate governance. However, as 
shown in the table, quite a smaller percentage of the MFIs (30%) employ the services of the big 
four external auditors. While this depicts a weaker governance structure for the MFIs, a possible 
reason could be due to the fact that most of the MFIs cannot afford the high audit fees that are 
usually charged by these renowned auditing firms. Also, considering the fact that a significant 
proportion of the MFIs are NGOs or Cooperatives, it could be assumed that, there will be less 
pressure from their financiers who are dominantly NGO donor-organizations (Mersland, 2011 
p.337) to employ the expensive services of the big four external auditors.  
 
Table 5-1 Summary Statistics of Variables used in the study 
Variable Obs (n) Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables 
Type Dm (NGO/Coop) 1618 0.64 1 0.48 0 1 
Dm Bank Regulation 1584 0.28 0 0.45 0 1 
Board Size 1487 7.00 6 3.32 1 23 
International Directors 1193 0.59 0 1.28 0 7 
Female Directors 781 1.78 1 1.96 0 16 
Dm Female CEO 1444 0.29 0 0.46 0 1 
Board Meet Year 1049 7.43 4 8.43 1 96 
Dm CEO Chair 1498 0.11 0 0.31 0 1 
Dm CEO Bus Exp 1050 0.85 1 0.36 0 1 
Dm CEO Bus Edu 669 0.64 1 0.47 0 1 
Top Mgt Team 1458 4.22 4 1.74 1 14 
External Auditors 945 0.30 0 0.46 0 1 
Independent Variable 
Dm Religious Initiated 1606 0.17 0 0.37 0 1 
Control Variables 
MFI Assets (×1000) 1585 6,349 2,672 13200 19.3 248,000 
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MFI Age 1611 9.29 8 6.76 0 79 
Dm Intern. Initiation 1602 0.39 0 0.49 0 1 
HDI 1613 0.56 0.59 0.14 0.239 0.791 
Percent Christian Popl. 
Lat. America 
1615 
1611 
0.64 
0.41 
0.85 
0 
0.37 
0.49 
0.002 
0 
0.995 
1 
Asia 1611 0.20 0 0.40 0 1 
East Europe 1499 0.14 0 0.34 0 1 
Africa 1611 0.29 0 0.45 0 1 
 
Moreover, the proportion of female CEOs and the average number of top management team is 
relatively low (29% and 4% respectively). The results for the other contextual controls indicate 
that most of the MFIs are situated in pro-Christian countries (64%) with reasonable levels of 
economic development (average HDI, 56%). Finally, the results indicate that, 28% of the MFIs 
are regulated by the banking authorities in their respective countries also signaling that the MFI 
industry is less-regulated. 
5.2  The Analysis of the Univariate Statistics 
The table 5-2a below represents the results of the univariate independent t-test run at a 95% 
confidence level. The t-test was run to compare the means of the religious and secular MFIs with 
respect to the corporate governance variables. This was done with the assumption that the two 
samples (religious and secular MFIs are drawn from normal distributions and that the variances 
of the two populations are approximately the same (Zikmund et al., 2013 p.534). I also include a 
nonparametric χ2-test to compare the medians of Christian and Secular groups along the 
governance variables. The results are presented in table 5-2b.  
 
As indicated in the Tables 5-2a, the t-test shows that, there exists significant difference between 
Christian and secular MFIs in terms of bank regulations and in agreement with the hypothesis; 
Christian MFIs are less regulated than secular MFIs. Again in concurrence with hypothesis, 
Christian MFIs significantly have more international directors than secular MFIs. However, 
contrary to hypothesis 12a, CEO duality is significantly lower in Christian MFIs than secular 
MFIs. This supports the counter hypothesis 12b and implies that, probably national institutional 
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factors of Christian international initiators have dominance over organizational culture in this 
case (Thomsen and Conyon, 2012). The results also indicate that a significantly lesser proportion 
of Christian MFIs have CEOs with business education than secular MFIs as hypothesized. 
Again, the results confirm the hypothesis 11b that Christians MFIs have a lesser probability for a 
female CEO than secular MFIs. Furthermore, the results revealed that a significantly higher 
proportion of Christian MFIs use the services of the big four external auditors which agrees with 
the hypothesis 9b. This situation is possibly caused by the influence of the higher proportion 
international directors in Christian MFIs and later on, the study will seek to confirm or reject this 
notion after other more rigorous methods have been used. 
Table 5-2a  The Results of the Univariate T-test 
Governance Variables Christian 
Mean 
Secular 
Mean 
T-value P-value 
DM NGO/Coop 0.67 0.64        0.836 0.404 
DM Bank Regulation 0.19 0.30   -3.641*** 0.000 
Board Size 6.85 7.01          -0.7 0.484 
International Directors 1.02 0.51     4.978*** 0.000 
Female Directors 1.88 1.75 0.694 0.488 
DM Female CEO 0.25 0.31 -1.784* 0.075 
Board Meet Year 8.1 7.3 -1.186 0.236 
DM CEO Chair 0.04 0.12    -3.51*** 0.000 
DM CEO Business Exp 0.82 0.85         -1.147 0.252 
DM CEO Business Edu 0.58 0.67     -1.963** 0.050 
Top Mgt Team 4.14 4.24          -0.855 0.393 
DM External  Audit 0.43 0.27          4.343*** 0.000 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
Group code: Christian = 1, Secular = 0  
 
Moreover, as shown in the table 5-2b, the comparison of the medians reveals that, Christian 
MFIs significantly have a larger board size, more board meetings and more female and 
international directors compared to Secular MFIs. However, the χ2-test indicates that Christian 
and secular MFIs are essentially similar across the lines of most of the governance variables.   
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Table 5-2b The Results of the Univariate χ2 -test 
Governance Variables Christian 
Median 
Secular 
Median 
χ2-value P-value 
DM NGO/Coop 1 1 0.14 0.704 
DM Bank Regulation 0 0 2.14 0.143 
Board Size 7 6          7.0*** 0.008 
International Directors 0 0    6.87*** 0.009 
Female Directors 2 1     11.63*** 0.001 
DM Female CEO 0 0     4.87** 0.027 
Board Meet Year 4 4     3.97** 0.046 
DM CEO Chair 0 0 0.92 0.337 
DM CEO Business Exp 1 1           0.66 0.417 
DM CEO Business Edu 1 1 0.54 0.463 
Top Mgt Team 4 4           0.11 0.741 
DM External  Audit 0 0 1.81 0.178 
    Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
Having presented the results for the univariate tests, the study now considers the outturn of the 
multiple regression methods in the subsequent sections. 
5.3  The Analysis of the Multivariate Regression Model 
The study now considers the multivariate regression analysis and begins with the results of the 
Random General Least Square (RGLS) regression in tables 5-3a and 5-3b. As shown in table 5-
3b, there is significantly higher number of international directors in Christian MFIs than in 
secular MFIs which conforms to the results of the univariate t-tests and the research hypothesis. 
This finding supports the notion that, most Christian MFIs have an international orientation than 
in the case of secular MFIs. However, in table 5-3a, the RGLS regression just as the univariate t-
test, could not reveal any significant relationship between Christian identity and the board size, 
number of board meetings in a year, number of top management team and number of female 
directors of the sampled MFIs. However, as shown in table 5-3a, the results revealed a 
significant positive relationship between MFI size and Board size but a significant negative 
relationship between MFI‟s age and board size. Again, as shown in table 5-3a, the results 
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indicated a significant positive relationship between MFI size and the number of board meetings 
in a year but significant negative relationship between the number of board meetings and the 
MFI‟s age. If the assumption that large board size and more board meetings reflect a more strict 
but not necessarily efficient governance holds, then this results signals that, a growing firm at its 
peak period might want to be strict enough in order to maintain its position and this could 
involve large board size and more board meetings but with time as it matures and its size 
declines it might also cut down on its board size and board meetings to ensure efficiency. The 
results also revealed a significant positive relationship between the number of top management 
team and MFI size and age. Furthermore, the RGLS regression results indicated a significant 
positive relationship between the number of board meetings in a year and the country‟s HDI as 
well as the percentage of Christian population. 
 
Table 5-3a  Differences in Board size, No. of Board Meetings and No. of Top 
Management Team between Christian and Secular MFIs 
Governance  
Variables 
Board Size No. of Board 
Meetings 
No. of Top Mgt. 
Team 
Christian MFIs -0.158 0.938 -0.150 
MFI Specific Controls 
MFI Size 1.64*** 2.42** 1.12*** 
MFI Age -0.34** -0.097*** 0.033*** 
Contextual Controls 
HDI -0.77 4.605** -0.311 
% of Christian Popl. -0.312 1.663** -0.439 
Regional Dummies  Yes   Yes   Yes 
 
Model Stats 
             N   1311               1334     943 
R
2
                                0.08    0.032              0.003 
    Wald X
2            
                     58.84***  19.87**             23.10*** 
 
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
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Table 5-3b  Differences in No. of International Directors and No. of Female 
Directors between Christian and Secular MFIs 
Governance Variables No. of International Dirs. No. of Female Directors 
Christian MFIs 0.610*** 0.028 
MFI Size 1.94 -5.93 
MFI Age 0.005 0.014 
HDI -0.426 0.013 
% of Christian Popl. 0.141 0.54* 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes 
 
Model Stats 
             N      1138                            741    
R
2
                                   0.07                0.02              
    Wald X
2            
                         28.49***              14.66*                        
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
 
Also, the results as shown in table 5-3b indicate a significant positive relationship between the 
percentage of Christian population and the number of female directors in an MFI. A possible 
explanation could be that, a higher proportion of the Christians in the countries where the 
sampled MFIs are located are protestant Christians who do not discourage female leadership.   
Having presented the RGLS regression results for the continuous dependent variables, I now 
present the results for the categorical dependent variables run by the Random-Effects Logistic 
Regression (RELR) model. The table 5-3c below represent the results for the governance 
differences between Christian and Secular MFIs along the lines of the relative use of the services 
of the big four external auditors, the probability for CEO duality, and the probabilities of an MFI 
having a CEO with business experience and a university business education. Then table 5-3d 
also presents the results of probabilities for NGO or Cooperative ownership form, bank 
regulations and a female CEO for the Christian MFI. 
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Table 5-3c  Differences in Probabilities for the Big Four External Auditors, 
CEO Chair, CEO Business Experience and CEO Business Education  
Governance 
Variables 
The Big Four 
Ext. Auditors 
CEO Chair CEO Business 
Experience 
CEO Business 
Education 
Christian MFIs 5.823* -3.74 -1.1033 -1.67 
MFI Size 1.12* 6.93 1.72*** 2.90** 
MFI Age -0.12 -0.11 -0.198** -0.010 
HDI --12.11 6.26 -8.166 -25.01** 
% of Christian 
Popl. 
-5.58 3.74 1.195 0.54 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes          Yes Yes 
 
Model Stats 
             N   851        1346           966      631 
   Pseudo R
2                                          
0.14
                  
            0.08           0.06      0.06 
     Wald X
2            
                   22.41***      14.97*           14.42*    29.05***                       
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively.  
 
As indicated in the table 5-3c, there is a significant positive relationship between Christian 
affiliation and the use of services of the big four external auditors just as the t-test revealed. 
While this concurs with hypothesis 9b, again another possible explanation could be due to the 
fact that, Christian MFIs have higher international orientation than the Secular MFIs as 
confirmed by the results of the t-test and OLS regressions that Christian MFIs significantly have 
a higher number of international directors. Probably these international directors might have 
transferred their ideas and experiences into the governance of Christian MFIs thereby influencing 
the high probability in the use of the services of the big four external auditors especially when 
the audit firms are globally recognized. However, although, the coefficients for CEO duality, 
CEO business experience and business education were negative, they were not statistically 
significant and this means there is not much difference between Christian and secular MFIs 
along the lines of these governance mechanisms. The results also revealed a positive relationship 
between MFI size and the probability to use the services of the big four auditors and this 
relationship was highly expected. Moreover, the results as presented in table 5-3d indicate a 
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highly significant negative relationship between Christian MFIs and bank regulation which is in 
line with hypothesis. This means that, there is less pressure on Christian MFIs to be regulated by 
banking authorities. This situation is probably because they relatively have less private investors 
compared to their secular counterparts. 
Table 5-3d  Differences in Probabilities for NGO or Coop. ownership form, 
Bank Regulation and a Female CEO between Christian and Secular MFIs 
Governance 
Variables 
Type of Ownership 
(NGO or Coop.) 
Bank Regulation Female CEO 
Christian MFIs -0.318 -1.88*** 2.13 
MFI Size -1.26*** 2.26*** -1.03* 
MFI Age 0.186*** -0.012 -0.06 
HDI 6.52*** -4.94** 4.10 
% of Christian Popl. -1.10 -1.85** 3.78 
Regional Dummies Yes Yes Yes 
 
Model Stats 
             N       1449          1436                 1292 
Pseudo R
2
                        0.08            0.12   0.03  
     Wald X
2            
                        59.66***                    256.30***                      12.55                       
Note: *, ** and *** indicate significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. 
 
5.4  The Analysis of the Alternative Methodological Approach 
In this section, I present the alternate methodological approach. In this new approach, I use the 
dummy for religious affiliation as the dependent variable and the governance variables as 
independent variables. After running tests for Multicollinearity, I reduce the number of 
independent variables by omitting three of the governance variables as indicated in chapter four. 
Having controlled for the effect of international orientation by introducing an extra control 
variable thus the dummy for international initiation, correcting for Heteroscedasticity by using 
robust standard errors, and transforming assets into the natural logarithm of assets to obtain 
normal distribution, the results of the second RELR model is represented in table 5-4 as follows; 
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Table 5-4  The Random Effects Logistic Regression 
sigma_u                     23.1204                   3.5853                    
rho                              0.9939                    0.0019                      
 
Random-effects logistic regression                                                Number of obs      =       435 
Group variable: case                                                                       Number of groups   =    105 
Random effects u_i ~ Gaussian                                                      Obs per group: min =       1 
                                                                                                                                  avg =     4.1 
                                                                                                                                  max=      7 
 
                                                                                                      Wald chi2 (18)    =    29.26 
Log likelihood = -46.256584                                                        Prob > chi2         =     0.0453 
95% confidence level                                                                   Pseudo R
2                 
=     0.2195 
Christian MFI Coef.             Std. Err Z P>|z|     
Type 1.1247 2.3090 0.49 0.626 
Dm_bank_regul -4.7566 2.2895 -2.08 0.038** 
Board_size 0.4321 0.5498 0.79 0.432 
Internat_dir 0.4696 0.8279 0.57 0.571 
Female_dir -0.5601 0.7059 -0.79 0.427 
Dm_female_ceo -2.0275 2.3621 -0.86 0.391 
Dm_ceo_chair -4.9526 5.3631 -0.92 0.356 
Dm_ceo_bus_exp -2.7108 2.3631 -1.15 0.251 
Extern_audit  6.3882 1.8540  3.45 0.001*** 
Lnassets -0.2357 0.7735 -0.30 0.761 
Age  0.2509 0.2160  1.16 0.245 
Int. Initiation  0.7205 2.1603  0.33 0.739 
HDI  6.0222 11.1141  0.54 0.588 
Lat. America  2.1667 -6.3542 -0.34 0.733 
Asia -6.5967 6.4845  1.02 0.309 
East Europe -5.3666 6.1018 -0.88 0.379 
Africa -7.2396 6.1291 -1.18 0.238 
Christian Popl -1.4016 3.2044 -0.44 0.662 
_cons -18.1783 12.7167 -1.43 0.153 
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The results of the new approach has revealed very remarkable findings in the sense that, after 
controlling for international initiation, it is found that, Christian affiliation is no longer positively 
related to the number of international directors. This implies that, the earlier finding was as a 
result of higher international orientation on the part of Christian MFIs and not as a result of 
influence from organizational features of the Christian MFI. This could also imply that, after 
controlling for international orientation, Christian MFIs are not significantly different from 
secular MFIs in terms of number of international directors. However, the results for bank 
regulation has remained consistent in all the three approaches thus the t-test, first and second 
regressions have all indicated that, there is a significant negative relationship between Christian 
affiliation and probability for bank regulation in microfinance industry.  
 
Again, the results have consistently revealed that, there is a significant positive relationship 
between Christian affiliation and the tendency to use the services of the big four external 
auditors. This means that, apart from the influence of the international directors due to high 
international orientation, the intrinsic  organizational features of the Christian organization have 
an impact on Christian MFIs‟ to employ the services of the big four external auditors. This also 
means that, as predicted by stewardship theory, in any contractual situation between an agent and 
a principal whereby the goals of the principal and the agent are better aligned, the agents would 
do whatever possible to meet both the explicit and implicit obligations towards the contract and 
this results have revealed that Christian MFIs significantly have a higher tendency to ensure 
proper accountability than secular MFIs even though from the secular business world point of 
view, secular MFIs have a greater motivation to employ the services of the big four external 
auditors than Christian MFIs. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6.  Discussion of Research Findings 
Having subjected the various hypotheses for the study to a series of univariate tests and multiple 
regression methods, the study reveals very thought-provoking results. Among such remarkable 
results include the case of the test for the effect of Christian affiliation on the number of 
international directors. The univariate t-test indicates that Christian MFIs significantly have more 
international directors than secular MFIs. Again the results of the first regression approach (see 
Table 5-3b) confirm that Christian MFIs significantly have more international directors. 
However, in the second regression approach, after having controlled for the effect of 
international initiation (see Table 5-4), the results could not reveal that Christian MFIs 
significantly have more international directors than secular MFIs although the regression 
coefficient is positive. This implies that, the fact that Christian MFIs have higher international 
orientation as revealed by the first regression results, does not necessarily mean that Christianity 
has a significant positive influence on the number of international directors in Christian MFIs. 
This also implies that, other factors such as the possible governance benefits of international 
directors (Oxelheim & Randøy, 2003) is  likely to be more influential in an MFI‟s choice of 
international directors than organizational features.  
 
Another interesting finding of the study is the result for the probability for Christian MFIs using 
the services of the big four external auditors. The study formulated two rival hypotheses for this 
variable which implies that, all things equal, it was not expected that the results will be 
significantly biased towards one of the hypothesized results, if not neutral. However, as revealed 
by the results for the t-test as well as the first regression, Christian MFIs were found to have a 
significantly higher tendency to use the services of the big four auditors than secular MFIs. A 
possible reason for this trend could be because, as a result of having a higher international 
orientation, Christian MFIs are likely to have more international directors who influence 
Christian MFIs to use more of the services of the big four auditors. Nonetheless, in the second 
regression, after controlling for the effect of international initiation, Christian MFIs no longer 
have a significant higher number of international directors than secular MFIs, and yet the results 
for the use of the big four auditors still holds that Christian MFIs significantly have a higher 
tendency to use the services of the big four external auditors than secular MFIs. This means that 
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other factors relating to the organizational characteristics of the Christian MFIs are probably the 
cause for this trend. Theoretically, this result implies that, agents in Christian MFIs, by virtue of 
the fact that some fundamental doctrines of Christianity (e.g. „the protestant ethic‟ by Weber, 
1958) encourages excellence and trustworthiness, might want to adhere to this principle and to 
prove to their owners and financiers that they are better stewards. Empirically, this supports the 
findings by Kitching (2009) that donors in NPOs attribute audit quality to the size of the external 
auditor and are more willing to increase the amount donations to NPOs audited by a high-quality 
auditor. Since it has been found that Christian MFIs depend on donor funding to a greater extent 
(Mersland et al, 2013), then it could be assumed that, Christian MFIs employ the services of the 
big four auditors to satisfy their donors.   
 
Moreover, the results of the t-test as well as the first and second regressions have consistently 
revealed that, most Christian MFIs are less-regulated by banking authorities than the case of 
secular MFIs. Even though, previous empirical studies (Mersland & Strøm, Hartarska & 
Mersland, 2012) could not find a significant governance role of bank regulations in MFIs, from 
the perspectives of stewardship theory, agency costs are expected to be lower in Christian MFIs 
because agents in Christian MFIs are expected to have a higher organizational identification. 
Therefore since bank regulations also play the role as an external governance mechanism aimed 
at ensuring transparency and accountability in order to safeguard the interest of private investors, 
then it could be assumed that there will less need for bank regulations in that regard. Again,   
coming back to the earlier finding that Christian MFIs are more dependent on donor support than 
shareholder funds (Mersland et al, 2013), it could be assumed that, there will be less need to 
impose external banking regulations on Christian MFIs than the case of secular MFIs. Another 
possible explanation for this result could be attributed to an earlier observation made by Hall 
(2002 p.9) that, governments have historically been reluctant to impose strict regulations on 
religious-affiliated entities in order to safeguard their political interest. The results for the tests of 
the other governance variables as shown in the table 5-4 were neither statistically significant at 
10% nor 5% significance levels. However, a glance through the p-values for the other predictor 
(governance) variables indicate that they all seem to converge around an average of 0.5, which 
essentially implies that Christian and secular MFIs are very similar along the lines of a majority 
of the governance variables. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7.  Conclusions, Implications, Limitations and Recommendation 
for Future Research 
7-1 Conclusion 
The purpose for this study was to assess the influence of Christian affiliation on corporate 
governance in MFIs. The study sought to achieve this goal by comparing Christian to Secular 
MFIs along a set of corporate governance variables majority of which have been used recently in 
the governance and microfinance literature. The study used secondary data collected on 403 
MFIs in 73 countries around the world by rating agencies and reported in rating reports. The 
study tests the research hypotheses in three stages. First, univariate t- and χ2 – tests are used to 
compare means and medians respectively between Christian and secular MFIs along the set of 
governance variables. Then by using the panel data model, the study first regresses the 
governance variables on the dummy for Christian affiliation alongside a set of MFI specific and 
contextual control variables by using the random effects OLS and logistic regression models. 
Then in order to enhance the robustness of the study, the study uses an alternative approach 
where the governance variables are used as the independent variables and the dummy for 
Christian affiliation used as the dependent variable. After running tests for Multicollinearity, 
Heteroscedasticity and normality of the error term and making appropriate adjustments, the study 
runs a second random effect logistics regression and presents the results to end the fifth chapter. 
The overall results indicated that Christianity is negatively correlated with the probability for 
bank regulations but positively correlated with the probability for the use of the services of the 
big four external auditors identified in this study. The results also show that, the tendency for 
Christian MFIs being regulated by banking authorities in a country is significantly lesser than 
secular MFIs. In addition, the study reveals that, the probability for Christian MFIs to use the 
services of the big four external auditors is significantly higher than the case of secular MFIs.  
7-2 Implications 
The fact that only two out of an initial selection of twelve governance variables proved to be 
significantly influenced by religious affiliation sends the signal that, the gap between Christian 
and secular MFIs in terms of governance systems and policy directions is very narrow and has 
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the potential of closing in the near future. However, with the levels of significance recorded for 
bank regulations and especially the use of the services big four external auditors, one cannot 
underestimate the influence of Christianity on the governance of Christian microfinance and 
other Christian economic organizations along the lines of the two governance mechanisms.   
7-3 Limitations to the study 
The unique features as well as the wide organizational diversity of MFIs have been identified as 
general constraints in the study of governance in MFIs (Hartarska, 2005) and this study is not an 
exception. For instance, it was difficult to distinguish the expected governance features of 
religious MFIs from the governance of Non-profit organizations since the two organizations are 
expected to be similar in terms of social orientation. Secondly, scholarly papers in the 
microfinance and governance literature mainly focus on governance mechanisms and 
performance indicators. In formulating the hypotheses on the expected influence of religious 
affiliation on governance features, insights needed to be drawn from literature on general MFI 
governance, non-profit organizations in order to predict the areas of priority between Christian 
and secular MFIs concerning the dual mission of MFIs thus outreach and financial sustainability. 
However, this study did not only focus on one side of the dual objectives in trying to formulate 
the hypotheses. Rather in most cases, the study took a more holistic approach since the research 
could not obtain much evidence to suggest that, the two dimensions of performance are perfect 
substitutes. 
7-4 Recommendations for future research 
The positive relationship between Christianity and the use of the services of the big four auditors, 
although could be theoretically and empirically proven, still deserves further investigation. A 
possible problem for further inquiry is whether this result can be generalized for all forms of 
Christian MFIs or not. Considering the fact that major Christian groups such as Catholics and 
Protestants who differ significantly in their ways of acting their faith, are also greatly involved in 
microfinance, one would ask, will the two subgroups respond similarly or differently if they are 
subject to similar tests about their probability to use the services of the big four external 
auditors? This could be a subject for future research. 
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